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JUSTICE AND PEACE: THE IMPORTANCE OF CHOOSING
ACCOUNTABILITY OVER REALPOLITIK*
M CherifBassiounit
At the end of the Second World War, the world collectively pledged
"never again." While the intention of this global promise may have been
sincere, its implementation has proved elusive. There have been over 250
conflicts in the twentieth century alone, resulting in the deaths of an
estimated 75 to 170 million persons. Both State and non-state actors
routinely commit extra-judicial execution, torture, rape and other violations
of international human rights and humanitarian law. In most cases, political
considerations permit perpetrators of gross violations of human rights to
operate with impunity. Yet, alongside the sad truth of our consistently
violent world stands the moral commitment of the post-war pledge and the
related vision of peace, justice and truth.
The human rights arena is defined by a constant tension between the
attraction of realpolitik and the demand for accountability. Realpolitik
involves the pursuit of political settlements unencumbered by moral and
ethical limitations. As such, this approach often runs directly counter to the
interests of justice, particularly as understood from the perspective of
victims of gross violations of human rights. Impunity, at both the
international and national levels, is commonly the outcome of realpolitik
which favors expedient political ends over the more complex task of
confronting responsibility. Accountability, in contrast, embodies the goals
of both retributive and restorative justice. This orientation views conflict
resolution as premised upon responsibility and requires sanctions for those
responsible, the establishment of a clear record of truth and efforts made to
provide redress to victims.
The pursuit of realpolitik may settle the more immediate problems of a
conflict, but, as history reveals, its achievements are frequently at the
expense of long-term peace, stability, and reconciliation. It is difficult to
achieve genuine peace without addressing victims' needs and without
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providing a wounded society with a sense of closure. A more profound
vision of peace requires accountability and often involves a series of
interconnected activities including: establishing the truth of what occurred,
punishing those most directly responsible for human suffering, and offering
redress to victims. Peace is not merely the absence of armed conflict; it is
the restoration of justice, and the use of law to mediate and resolve inter-
social and inter-personal discord. The pursuit of justice and accountability
fulfills fundamental human needs and expresses key values necessary for
the prevention and deterrence of future conflicts. For this reason, sacrificing
justice and accountability for the immediacy of realpolitik represents a
short-term vision of expediency over more enduring human values.
The conflict between realpolitik and justice seldom takes a visible
form. Instead, it is generally concealed from the general public. Often, the
decision to pursue realpolitik strategies takes place during secret
negotiations or through processes and formalities designed to obfuscate the
truth and manipulate public perceptions. Some mechanisms of concealment
are formal in nature, such as introducing weak components into legal norms
and judicial institutions in order to deprive them of the capacity to ensure
accountability. In this way, where advocates of realpolitik must accept a
legal norm of accountability, they often neutralize its potential and render
its impact limited and insubstantial. The goals of realpolitik can also be
achieved by creating legal institutions with a mandate to administer justice,
and then, imposing bureaucratic, logistical and financial constraints to
render them ineffective or only marginally effective.
The creation of the human rights system in the wake of the Second
World War and its intimate link to the promise of "Never Again" have
formalized the conflict between the realpolitik and a politics of
accountability. These issues are especially serious where there is a need to
face extreme political violence, as in the wake of armed conflict or in
response to atrocities committed by authoritarian regimes. While there exist
many cases where the international community has dealt with these issues,
it is useful to review the tension between realpolitik and accountability in a
few specific instances including: the response to German aggression
following the First World War, the failure to respond to the Turkish
genocide committed against the Armenian people, the Nuremburg and
Tokyo Tribunals, and responses to the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. In
reviewing these cases, one can see an evolving concerns with the
importance of formal mechanisms of accountability as well as what might
be a growing moral realization of the central role of justice in establishing
the foundations for genuine and long-lasting peace.
After the First World War - Realpolitik and German Aggression
One notable example of early 2 0 th century realpolitik arose after World
War I in connection with the peace treaties between the Allies and both
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Germany and Turkey. With respect to the Germans, the 1919 Treaty of
Versailles provided for two extraordinary developments in international
criminal accountability. First, the Treaty established a legal basis to
prosecute the Kaiser of Germany for initiating what we would call today a
war of aggression. Second, the Treaty provided for the prosecution of
German military personnel for war crimes.
As to the first development, the drafters of the relevant article in the
Treaty, Article 227, defined the crime for which the Kaiser was to stand
trial as a "supreme offence against international morality and the sanctity of
treaties." The crime was phrased in such vague political terms that it
allowed the Netherlands to give political asylum to the Kaiser on the
grounds that no such crime, as defined in Article 227, existed. Thus, his
purported prosecution was prevented.
However, even if the Kaiser would have been prosecuted, his defense
could have been that such a legal norm could not constitute a crime under
the "principles of legality" of all the world's major legal systems. In fact,
the drafters probably never intended to prosecute the Kaiser. The British
drafters of the definition were not eager to prosecute a crowned head,
particularly when the family lineage of that crowned head was related to
their own monarchy. The example of Article 227 is a key example of a
situation where a legal norm is purposely drafted to be ambiguous to
prevent its effective application and, ultimately, as a means of supporting
impunity.
The effort to enforce the second development in international criminal
accountability - the prosecution of German war criminals - began with the
work of the Commission on the Responsibilities of the Authors of the War
and on Enforcement of Penalties (the "1919 Commission"), established by
the victorious Allies in 1919. The Commission's work was also
compromised by political considerations. At first, the Commission
investigated war crimes and compiled a list of some 20,000 people it
believed should be prosecuted for war crimes. However, it took a
significant amount of time to conduct the investigations leading to the final
list and, gradually, the Allies lost their interest in prosecution. By 1922,
three years after they began, the Allied governments had still not formed
the tribunals described in Articles 228 and 229 of the Treaty. In fact, they
were ready to let bygones be bygones. However, in Europe, particularly in
France, an influential group if academics, intellectuals, and journalists
continued to press for prosecution. In response, the Allies pacified
advocates of accountability by requesting that Germany take on the
responsibility for the prosecutions. In addition, the Allies determined that
the list had to be reduced, and settled for the prosecution of 895 individuals
instead of the original 20,000.
The German government, however, thought that 895 was too high a
number. After extensive political negotiations with Germany, the Allies
dramatically reduced the number of prosecutions to forty-five. Of those
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forty- five individuals, only twenty-two were prosecuted by Germany in
1923. One of the more severe penalties resulting from these prosecutions
was three years of imprisonment. That three-year sentence purported to
punish one of the worst crimes in naval warfare history in which a U-boat
sank a hospital ship carrying approximately three hundred wounded and
then surfaced to machine-gun the survivors found hanging to rafts on the
high seas. By the time these prosecutions occurred, the passage of time had
dampened the enthusiasm of justice proponents, and the interest of Allied
governments. The advocates of realpolitik at the time understood the
demand for justice more or less as they see it today, as, at worst, a nuisance
and, at best, a tool to achieve their goals. In this case, as in many similar
situations, they saw the passage of time as an important ally to avoid
prosecutions and evade the complex demands of accountability.
Realpolitik and the Failure to Face the Armenian Genocide
Another important and tragic development in international criminal
accountability involved the world's response to the Turkish government's
mass killing of Armenians in 1915. The 1919 Commission that allowed for
institutionalized impunity for German war crimes took cognizance of the
fact that Turkey, an ally of Germany, killed an estimated 250,000 to
1,000,000 Armenians as part of a policy of political persecution.
Prior to the 1919 Commission's work on this matter, nothing in
international legal norms contemplated individual criminal responsibility
under international law for public officials and others who committed
crimes against their own citizens. The 1919 Commission, however, found
that the Preamble to the 1907 Hague Convention contained a reference to
"the laws of humanity." The 1919 Commission concluded that the
systematic killing of a civilian population pursuant to state policy, however
tacit, violated the "laws of humanity," and that the Turkish officials, who
had engaged in such acts, either by commission or omission, were to be
charged with "crimes against the laws of humanity."
The United States and Japan opposed such a notion on the basis that it
violated legal positivism, and issued a formal written dissent to that effect.
Interestingly, however, the 1920 Treaty of Peace between the Allied Powers
and Turkey, known as the Treaty of Sevres, specifically provided for the
prosecution of Turkish officials, many of whom were already in British
custody and were being held in Malta. Because of the objections of the
United States and Japan, however, the Treaty of Sevres was never ratified.
Instead, it was replaced in 1923 by the Treaty of Lausanne, which contained
an unpublished protocol guaranteeing amnesty to the very persons who
were to be prosecuted under the Treaty of Sevres.
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The reason for this amnesty was the emergence of a new geopolitical
reality that made Turkey, the former enemy, a necessary ally against the
emerging power of the communist Soviet Union. Since the first line of
Western defense against Russian communism was Turkey, the Allies could
not afford to offend the sensitivities of the country's nationalistic
government who openly denied the mass murder of Armenians (and
continue to deny its severity to this day). In light of Turkey's emerging
political importance, attempts at accountability were frustrated and
impunity was achieved de jure by the unpublished protocol. Thus, justice
for the victims of the Armenian killings was forsaken for the political
compromise of realpolitik. Only a few years later, in 1939, Adolf Hitler
was speaking to his generals on the eve of the invasion of Poland and is
reported to have asked, "Who now remembers the Armenians?" That
comment encapsulates the harsh victory of realpolitik, reminding us of the
serious risks associated with failing to demand accountability for severe
political violence.
The Innovation of Nuremburg and the Ineffectuality of the Tokyo
Tribunal
In the wake of the Second World War, the Allies faced the difficult
issue of what to do with high-ranking leaders of the fallen Nazi regime. In
light of the terrible destruction of the war and the public revelation of the
Holocaust, there was great pressure to demand accountability, either
through decree of the victors, as some advocated, or, through an
adjudicative process grounded in rule of law. The decision to create the
International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg (the "IMT" or "Nuremburg
tribunal") and the International Military Tribunal for the Far East at Tokyo
(the "IMTFE" or "Tokyo tribunal") represent landmark cases of choosing
law over political might. While the Allies could have engaged in any
mechanism of punishment, they chose a system that respected basic ideas of
rational accountability, providing those accused with the possibility of
defending themselves in court in a system that required prosecutors to
prove guilt through the presentation of objective and compelling evidence.
This process rested on the United States and other Allies willingness to
accept the idea of "crimes against the laws of humanity" through the
definition a new kind of crime, "crimes against humanity." The atrocities of
World War II made it imperative to revisit the need to prosecute those who
committed severe acts of violence which were later described in Article
6(c) of the Nuremberg Charter as "crimes against humanity." It should be
stated, however, that since the Nuremberg Charter there has never been a
specialized international convention on "crimes against humanity"
(fortunately, the Statute of the International Criminal Court includes a
progressive definition of that crime).
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The Nuremburg tribunal and the Tokyo tribunal constituted a major
historic development in the establishment of individual criminal
responsibility under international law. Through these processes, heads of
state were no longer given immunity and the traditional defense of
"obedience to superior orders" was eliminated. However, significant
differences exist in the structure of these two tribunals. The original
Nuremberg tribunal was a product of the London Treaty of August 8, 1945,
which was signed by four countries and acceded to by nineteen others. In
the Far East, on the other hand, the tribunal's foundation rested on General
MacArthur's proclamation establishing another tribunal patterned after
Nuremberg and his subsequent appointment of its judges. While the
Nuremburg tribunal is widely viewed as a major historical step in the
evolution of international norms of accountability, the Tokyo tribunal
reveals how adjudicative bodies can be used to support realpolitik.
The Nuremburg tribunal indicted twenty-four people, of which twenty-
two stood trial. In the subsequent American, British, Russian, and French
proceedings, another 50,000 people were tried. However, due to political
considerations, the prosecution process differed in Europe and the Far East.
In Germany, prosecutions were conducted not only before the IMT, but also
before Allied tribunals in their respective zones of occupation and by
German tribunals and other national tribunals elsewhere. In the Far East,
however, there were no national Japanese prosecutions. Twenty-eight
persons were tried before the IMTFE, and various military tribunals of the
nineteen Allies tried some 5,700 persons in various countries of the Far
East.
The Japanese reacted against having their citizens jailed in so many
different places. After most of the prosecutions ended in 1951, the
Japanese government successfully negotiated an agreement whereby all
convicted Japanese prisoners were allowed to return to Tokyo and serve
their sentences there. The official Treaty of Peace was signed in San
Francisco in 1953, and by the end of that year not one of the more than
15,000 Japanese prisoners of war who had been convicted of war crimes
remained in prison. Most telling is the fact that, by 1954, two of the major
war criminals convicted by the IMTFE became the Prime Minister and the
Minister of Foreign Affairs of Japan.
By that time, the United States had based its future Southeast Asia
policy on Japan's stability and strength, and it was important that the
Japanese not feel humiliated by the consequences of World War II. Indeed
the Japanese, unlike the Germans, did not feel morally blameworthy for
their deeds during World War II. Their culture also made them more
susceptible to humiliation, and the United States was careful to avoid
placing them in that situation. In return, Japan became a strong ally of the




When MacArthur entered Tokyo, Emperor Hirohito was still in power.
Nevertheless, the Emperor was never charged with the crime of aggression
or any other crime, despite the fact that Japan could never have gone to war
had he not explicitly approved the action. Moreover, not a single person
indicted or prosecuted for the horrific violations that have come to be
known as the "Rape of Nanking." Instead of focusing on accountability,
MacArthur structured the Tokyo Tribunal to function as a strategy for
achieving control over the occupied territories. To the extent that justice
could be manipulated, it was. For example, General Yamashita was
condemned in the Philippines not for crimes of which he had no
knowledge. His conviction was based on the idea that a commanding
officer bears criminal responsibility for what he should know about what
his troops might do, even though he had issued specific orders to his troops
prohibiting crimes against civilians. However, General MacArthur pursued
this prosecution to set an example that was useful fro the post-war
occupation. The guiding vision for these prosecutions, then, was political
strategy.
Justice was used by MacArthur as an illusion in true Potemkin fashion.
Just as the Russian General Potemkin built villages in Crimea along the
river so that Catherine the Great would have the impression that the
Crimean peasants were well-fed, well-nourished, and satisfied, so too did
the prosecutions in the Far East give the impression that justice was being
done. In fact, what we witnessed in the Far East is what might be termed as
Potemkin international criminal justice. We see a little bit of criminal
justice, a little bit of realism on occasion, and a few effective trials.
Bartering Justice and Yugoslavia
The 1991-95 war in the former Yugoslavia is another example of
bartering justice for political negotiation, and then witnessing increased
atrocities (in Kosovo) that reflected the process of negotiation. The
atrocities occurring during the 1991-95 war were broadcast and published
all over the world. This display may well have pushed world public opinion
to the limits of its tolerance eventually pressuring the major powers to act.
In the United States, 1992 was an election year and the government
was unwilling to commit military personnel to what it considered a
"European problem." In addition, European countries were not yet
sufficiently shamed by the "ethnic cleansing" that occurred on their
continent to take decisive action, despite the promise of "Never Again".
Thus, there was no military intervention early in the conflict when
concerted action might have saved tens of thousands of lives and prevented
the mass migration of refugees related to the conflict. Worse yet, France
and the United Kingdom had committed some 30,000 peacekeepers who
turned out to be more exposed to danger than originally thought.
Consequently, the peacekeepers were, for all practical purposes, potentially
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vulnerable hostages, a fact that crippled the potential actions of both France
and the United Kingdom.
In the face of that political reality, the dominant approach involved
inducing the parties to accept a negotiated settlement. This state of affairs
left the negotiators, mainly Lord David Owen, with very few bargaining
chips. Political settlement could only be achieved by the acquiescence of
the weakest party to the conflict, namely Bosnia, in favor of Serbia and
Croatia. The only thing that prevented a settlement of this type was the
daily media coverage of ethnic cleansing, rape, reports of torture, and the
systematic destruction of personal and cultural property. Certainly, the last
thing that Owen needed was a formal body that proved the criminality of
Serbian leaders, such as Milosevic, and the victimization of the Bosnians. If
that had happened, world public opinion might clamor for accountability.
Milosevic and other Serbian leaders were unlikely to agree to any
settlement that involved a serious commitment to accountability. For this
reason, Owen thought that equal moral blameworthiness was needed to
achieve a climate that would convince the Bosnians to accept whatever the
Serbians dictated, and to avoid focusing on the prospect of the prosecution
of Serbian leaders. To show otherwise, namely that one side committed
heinous crimes against the other, was an impediment to realpolitik.
In October 1992, under pressure from the international civil society
and at the behest of the United States, the Security Council of the United
Nations established the Commission of Experts to Investigate the War
Crimes and Other Violations of International Humanitarian Law in the
Former Yugoslavia (the "Commission"). I had the honor of chairing the
Commission which was given a broad mandate to investigate political
violence in the region. Such a Commission, if it were to carry out its
mandate to the fullest, would prevent the kind of political accommodation
that rewards the perpetrators of crimes against humanity, war crimes, and
perhaps even genocide.
This potentially powerful Commission was received with a mixed
response. In order to insure that the Commission would not interfere with
the ongoing peace negotiations, the United Nations did not provide the
Commission with any resources to carry out its mandate of investigating
violations of international humanitarian law and other crimes. Left to its
own devices, the Commission obtained assistance outside of the United
Nations system to conduct its investigations. However, even after
overcoming the burden of inadequate resources, the Commission was
further hampered by an array of United Nations bureaucratic hurdles.
The story of how the Commission overcame these hurdles is both
extraordinary and, I believe, will one day be recognized as a major historic
breakthrough. The Commission's thirty-nine field missions, including the
largest mass rape investigation ever conducted, produced the longest
Security Council report in history - some 3,500 pages, backed by more than
65,000 documents and more than 300 hours of videotapes. The
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overwhelming evidence and the Commission's interim report of February
1993, were among the main reasons why the Security Council established
the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (the
"ICTY") in May 1993. The language of the Council's resolution
establishing the tribunal reflected the Commission's findings.
Yet, while the Commission was operating, realpolitik was in full force.
This is evidenced by the actions of Richard Holbrook and other key players
in the process that led to the Dayton Accord of 1994. For example,
Holbrook assisted in a secret negotiation in which the Croatian government
would gain control of a Serb-inhabited region of Croatia in return for
allowing the Serbian government to move Croatians out of a region of
Serbia. The Croatian government was allowed to move 200,000 Serbs out
of an area in Croatia known as the Krajinas and the Serbian government
was allowed to move a large number of Croats out a corridor stretching
from Srebrenica to Brcko in the northernmost section of Bosnia, along the
Drina River. Basically, this corridor would connect the Serb-inhabited areas
of Bosnia with Serbia proper. The corridor was part of the greater Serbian
plan.
Holbrook realized that achieving these ends through a public
settlement or negotiation would be difficult. So, he arranged for the
Croatian army to be re-trained by a major U.S. corporation headed by a
former secretary of defense. With the agreement of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization ("NATO"), former U.S. military personnel trained
them with weapons supplied by Germany. The new Croatian army became
strong, well-disciplined, well-organized, and eventually moved on to the
Krajinas. The American ambassador rode behind the reconnaissance forces
to ensure that nothing worse than removal would happen to the Serbs in the
region. Croatian control of the Krajinas, therefore, became the new reality,
irrespective of issues of justice or of the rights of the people involved.
The same type of operation was supposed to occur in the Srebrenica-
Brcko corridor. This operation was controlled by General Radtko Mladic
who moved approximately 4,000 troops to the region. The French president
told the local French commander, General Jean-Vie, not to request any
NATO strikes during this operation. When Mladic moved in, there were
only 500 Dutch soldiers with small sidearm weapons who were easily
overtaken by the superior Serbian force. As the attack on Srebrenica
intensified, 7,000 men were killed. Their bodies were left in the
surrounding fields. The day after the massacre, Ambassador Madeleine
Albright showed satellite imagery of these corpses to the United Nation's
Security Council. Needless to say, the day after the photo was displayed,
the field was bulldozed and only a few remains were left behind.
Holbrook's treatment of the former Yugoslavia produced the Dayton
agreements in 1994 which provided de facto impunity to the intellectual
authors of the extreme violence of the Balkans, including Milosevic,
Mladic, and Karadzic. The result was not peace, and certainly not
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reconciliation, but a truce, a truce that was short-lived in light of the
aforementioned massacre in Srebemcia in 1995, and the commencement of
"ethnic cleansing" in Kosovo in 1998. While agreements of this type may
appear politically valuable in the short term, granting impunity to those
responsible for crimes against humanity may not ultimately serve the goals
of peace. Perhaps it is idealistic or naive of me to advocate accountability
in such cases. However, I think that while it may be difficult to deal with
the complex truth of political violence, its harsh reality has a way of
resurfacing long after the half-truths and misrepresentations encouraged by
realpolitik have been voiced and officially accepted.
The ICTY represents an attempt to deal with the truth, although it is
not ideal. Even after it was established, few prosecutions occurred, because
NATO forces were reluctant to apprehend indicted criminals for fear of
retaliation. Even after prosecutions began, the ICTY has only partially
achieved the true goals of accountability. Nevertheless, the establishment of
the ICTY broke down psychological, political, and legal barriers that
existed against international criminal justice. Soon thereafter, the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (the "ICTR") was established.
So, by 1994, it was evident that political accommodation would not be
devoid of all accountability.
Certainly, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia has produced some very effective prosecutions, and there have
been some successful prosecutions in the Rwanda tribunal. While we must
recognize the great merits of these accomplishments, we must not forget
that there is much left to be accomplished. I say this because major
perpetrators remain at large, and will probably continue to remain at large
for so long as they serve a political purpose. The battle, which previously
pitted political accommodation against accountability, now focused on how
political accommodation could co-opt accountability. Now, we must deal
with this tension between the attempt to develop international criminal
justice in its own right, and the realpolitik view of international criminal
justice as a useful tool in the achievement of desired political results.
Acknowledging Suffering
Reviewing the complex political factors that determine broad policy
responses to political violence often draws attention to the empowered
actors whose decisions guide history. This perspective tends to mask the
experiences of victims, the countless individuals whose human suffering
defines the moral claim of the post-war demand of "Never Again." In
considering these issues, I am reminded of a story which was told to me
while the Commission was conducting its rape investigation in the former
Yugoslavia. It is a difficult story to hear, but one that I carry like one carries
a cross, a weight that bears with it both responsibility and a reminder of the
real reasons for demanding accountability.
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The events of this story occurred in 1993 when the Commission was
investigating the Foca rapes that are now being prosecuted in the ICTY.
Thirty-three women had volunteered to assist in the investigation. They
were divided into eleven teams of three, each consisting of a prosecutor, a
psychiatrist, and an interpreter. The teams traveled throughout the country
with lists of witnesses, interviewing a total of 223 rape victims. We took
great pains to protect the identity of these victims and to protect the
integrity of the impending prosecutions. In order to avoid the potential
danger of prior inconsistent statements that defense attorneys could use
against the victims, the prosecutor for each team would take notes, in her
own words, of each victim interview, and then present these reports to me
in writing. The only written materials created would therefore be deemed
attorney work-product and undiscoverable.
One of my prosecutors was a Crown prosecutor from Canada with nine
years of experience in violent crimes. She came to me in tears one day and
announced that she was quitting and leaving the next day. In explanation,
she told me the following story:
A man on crutches whose legs seemed to have been broken came over
to see us. He looked as if he could have been sixty or eighty years old and
aged beyond repair, but in actuality he was probably in his forties. He
presented himself as a Catholic Croat who lived in the Serb area of
Sarajevo. He had married a Serb woman who was the widow of a Muslim
from Sarajevo, and who had two beautiful teenaged daughters. After she
and the man on crutches married, he adopted her daughters and moved to
her apartment on the Serb side of town. Together they opened a cafe with a
soccer motif in the neighborhood, since he had been a soccer player with
the Croatian soccer team in Sarajevo before their marriage. He often had
lively discussions about soccer matches with the Serb youths who
patronized his business before the war came. His neighborhood then
became Serb-controlled, and the young thugs who joined the paramilitary
and the police had free rein in their abuse of non-Serbs.
One day, a group of about a half a dozen young thugs who were soccer
fans came into the caf6 with weapons and hauled the man to the police
station. They tied him up on the floor and started berating him because he
won a championship for the Croatian soccer team against the Serb team.
They then proceeded to take their rifle butts and break both of his legs so
that he would never play soccer again. While he was laying there on the
floor with two broken legs, the thugs went and got his wife and two
daughters. They told the wife in the presence of her husband and her two
daughters that unless she did everything they wanted, they would rape the
two girls. The mother, in order to protect her daughters, complied and
submitted to degrading and humiliating sexual acts. Totally unexpectedly,
she was turned to face her husband and daughters, and one of the men slit
her throat. While she was writhing on the floor dying, they raped the two
girls in the presence of their stepfather. Then, when they were finished, they
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slit the throats of the two girls. Next, in perhaps the worst possible cruelty,
they took the man and dumped him out in the streets so he would serve as a
living example of what could happen to others like himself and his family.
The man came over to tell our team the story last night, and this morning I
discovered that he had committed suicide during the night, leaving only the
message: "I lived long enough to tell my story to someone in the hope that
it will be told in the future."
Ever since that day, I have considered it my duty to convey the
significance of this story around the world so that those tragic events of
such a recent past are not easily forgotten. Sadly, it is precisely these sorts
of stories - and there are so many of them - that are frequently lost. No
books or theories on international justice could ever be as poignant as this
particular testimony. Here is a victim who was dehumanized and wanted
justice from the United Nations and from the world. I believe that we owe
justice to this victim and to the countless other victims whom we do not
know, but who have directly suffered acts of extreme violence, degradation
and cruelty. We owe justice to victims all over the world, justice that
punishes those responsible and prevents the recurrence of such acts. We
also owe ourselves a commitment to accountability because if we forget our
obligation to the unknown victims, we forget what it means to be human.
The Promise of International Justice
In reviewing key cases from the twentieth century, it is useful to think
of the essential tensions between realpolitik and accountability as an
evolving historical process defined by a series of interlinked circles. One
circle is the intellectual circle, the circle of the evolution of ideas, ideas that
derive from social values predicated on philosophic and religious values.
That circle develops and expands over the course of time, but it is only
capable of influencing other circles. The second circle is the circle of the
evolution of international instruments from which we may derive
proscriptive and prescriptive norms. The elements of enforcement of these
norms are very sparse, but they begin to develop the body of binding legal
obligation. The third circle is the circle of enforcement. History teaches us
that proscriptions and prescriptions are largely meaningless in the absence
of the effective, fair, and impartial enforcement and administration of
justice. Nevertheless, while we have developed enforcement models at the
national levels, for many reasons we have been reluctant to develop such
models at the international level.
One such reason may be the intricate relationship between the
administration of justice and notions of national sovereignty. Transcending
the psychological attachment to national sovereignty in favor of an
international system of enforcement may be too much for many to bear.
Another reason for the failure to develop international enforcement models
may be that those, like myself, who work in the field of criminal justice are
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not broad-minded or open-minded enough to make the leap from the
national model to the globalization of justice. In the last two decades, the
media consistently has relayed to an ever-widening world audience the
numerous tragedies that have occurred in almost every region of the world.
As means of communication expanded and more people acquired greater
access to news information, the cumulative impact of reported conflicts and
victimization reached such a point in world public opinion that it became
difficult for governments to ignore accountability and to allow perpetrators
to benefit from impunity.
The ultimate question, then, is how to develop value neutral rules that
can be enforced upon all sides. Ideally, for pure enforcement purposes, one
might wish to develop a supranational system of justice, but such a concept
remains internationally unacceptable. The next best choice is an
international system accepted by consent of the states. If a system is based
on broad international consent, however, it will be only as strong as the
states wish it to be. An additional problem with such an international
system is the effect of a weak member. If one state's enforcement of the
agreed international norms is sufficiently weak that it will become a state of
refuge for international criminals, that state will be the Achilles heel of the
international system.
Thus, we have now developed an International Criminal Court ("ICC")
that will be international rather than supranational, that will be dependent
upon states, and that will be complementary. This underlying principle
creates the impression, or the feeling, of national systems that can be linked
immediately and intimately to a mutually supportive international system.
This impression, however, is an illusion as the domestic and international
judicial realms remain quite separate. If the two systems were better
connected, the ICC could be a true extension of national criminal
jurisdiction, with the equivalent of a change of venue motion allowing some
national cases to be brought before it. However, this is not the case and the
current situation may, in fact, be all that is possible at this moment in
history.
It is difficult to know where the ICC will take us. After all, each
historic period witnesses the development of certain institutions, and these
institutions become the bases and foundations for the next generation of
institutions; and sometimes the weaknesses of one generation are cured by
the next. Whenever I feel particularly discouraged, I look to my good friend
Ben Ferencz, a former Nuremberg prosecutor, and say to myself, "I'll pick
up from where he left off." Because if he had the fortitude to carry it
forward for so many years, and if he is still in great spirits and full of
enthusiasm, then I will do my share before passing it on to my students, and
then they will do their share before finding someone else to carry on. In a
sense, then, that is the evolutionary process with which we are dealing.
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Now that the advocates of realpolitik have realized that they can no
longer eliminate justice from the political settlement equation, as was the
case after World War I and II and so many cases thereafter, the danger is
that justice will be co-opted, subverted, and used as a fig leaf to achieve
accommodation. Even so, the efforts of advocates of realpolitik to barter
and compromise justice go on, and impunity is the carrot that they offer to
leaders of conflicts who have committed terrible crimes, as a way of
securing a political settlement.
In our globalized society, we can no longer exclude justice from our
international legal system. The establishment of the ICC is a step in the
direction of providing international criminal justice. However, the ICC will
not prevent injustice, conflicts, or crimes. It will neither end impunity nor
will it consistently achieve justice. The ICC is merely an added means by
which to achieve accountability. However, it is a necessary institution for
the attainment of the goals of international criminal justice, and it should be
viewed as an incremental contribution to the achievement of these goals.
The choices facing the international community are not easy. There is
real tension between the two goals of achieving political solutions and
achieving higher values. And, just as there is a checks and balances system
in place in the United States, there is an informal checks and balances
system at the international level. This informal system consists of those few
people who will continue to keep the pressure on governments, that will
make it difficult for governments to make the most egregious or outrageous
deals, that will denounce governments when necessary, and that will praise
governments when they act honorably and in accordance with international
humanist principles. These few people will ensure a sense of continuity and
progress. While progress may be slow, the evolution of humankind and the
history of law teaches us that progress has always been slow and
painstaking.
It is my hope that in this age of globalization, when more people are
studying law than ever, that these prospective lawyers will be the true
legions of justice. No matter how limited their efforts and no matter how
small their voices may be, I think these prospective lawyers will add a
strong voice to what I call "international civil society," and I think
international civil society is the necessary countervailing force to the forces
of cynicism and realpolitik. The presence of an international civil society
makes it more difficult for the forces of cynicism and realpolitik to achieve
their ultimate goals of compromising justice.
I am convinced that there can truly be no peace without justice; and,
certainly, there can be no justice without truth. Difficult as it may be, we
should be dedicated to the pursuit of those goals. We should attempt to
approximate them as best we can and to dedicate some of our efforts to
preventing the cynics, the skeptics, and the advocates of realpolitik from
compromising justice. If we fail to do so, we are condemned to repeat our
mistakes.
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